A construction of explicit codes for the wiretap channel is proposed. Appropriate choices of the construction parameters yield, within a unified design framework, the achievability of the secrecy capacity of (i) Wyner's wiretap channel, (ii) the wiretap channel of type II, (iii) the wiretap channel of type II with noisy main channel, (iv) the hybrid Wyner's/type II wiretap channel, and the best known singleletter achievable secrecy rates for (v) the wiretap channel when uncertainties hold on the eavesdropper's channel statistics (compound model), (vi) the wiretap channel when the eavesdropper's channel statistics are arbitrarily varying. Results are obtained for strong secrecy, do not require any symmetry or degradation assumptions on the channel, and do not require a pre-shared secret between the legitimate users. The underlying construction idea is an efficient emulation of random binning via polar codes to obtain reliability, coupled with universal hashing implemented via invertible extractors to ensure strong secrecy.
• In Wyner's wiretap channel [2] , a sender wishes to encode a message M and send the result X 1:N to a legitimate receiver by the N -time use of a degraded discrete memoryless channel described by the distribution p Y 1:N Z 1:N |X 1:N = N i=1 p Y |X p Z|Y such that (i) M can be reconstructed from the legitimate receiver channel output Y 1:N , and (ii) M is almost independent of the channel output of the eavesdropper Z 1:N , in the sense lim N →∞ 1 N I(M ; Z 1:N ) = 0. A refinement obtained in [5] is the characterization of the secrecy capacity for an arbitrary discrete memoryless wiretap channel described by the distribution p Y 1:N Z 1:N |X 1:N = N i=1 p Y Z|X . Another refinement of [2] is a strengthening, called strong secrecy, of the security guarantee into lim N →∞ I(M ; Z 1:N ) = 0, e.g., [6] .
Explicit coding schemes based on low-density parity-check codes [7] [8] [9] , polar codes [10] [11] [12] [13] , and invertible extractors [14] , [15] have been successfully developed for special cases of Wyner's model [2] , in which the channels are at least assumed to be symmetric. Explicit and non-explicit codes for arbitrary channels based on polar codes have also been proposed in [12] , [16] [17] [18] .
• The wiretap channel of type II, introduced in [19] , is a model related to [2] , where a sender encodes a message M into a sequence of symbols X 1:N , which is sent to a legitimate receiver over a noiseless channel in the presence of an eavesdropper able to obtain µ symbols of its choice among the Nsymbol sequence X 1:N . The secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel of type II is obtained in [19] and subsequently obtained in [20] when the communication channel between the legitmate users is noisy. The wiretap channel of type II and the original wiretap channel [2] can be unified in a hybrid model [21] , where the eavesdropper has now access to µ symbols of its choice among X 1:N , as in [19] , and a noisy version of the remaining symbols of the encoded message X 1:N , as in [2] . The secrecy capacity for this model is also derived in [21] .
To the best of our knowledge, explicit coding schemes have only been proposed for the original wiretap channel of type II model [19] , e.g., [6] , [22] . several models assume that the eavesdropper's channel statistics are known to belong to a given set of channel statistics without knowing to which specific element of the set they correspond. Such models include (i) the compound wiretap channel [23] , where the eavesdropper's channel statistics is known to be fixed for all the channel uses, and (ii) the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel [24] , [25] ,
where the eavesdropper's channel statistics can change at each channel use. For general channels, lower and upper bounds on the secrecy capacity have been derived in [23] [24] [25] but no capacity result is known for these two models.
To the best of our knowledge, only the explicit coding schemes in [14] , [15] can be used for these models. These coding schemes, however, do not achieve the best known achievable rates [3] , [23] [24] [25] (obtained non-constructively), when the channels are asymmetric or non-degraded.
Our contribution is an explicit coding scheme that achieves, by appropriate choices of its parameters, We now review known results for six special cases of the model. [5] ). Consider Wyner's wiretap channel, i.e., |S|= 1 and α = 0. Then, the secrecy capacity is
Theorem 2 ( [19] ). Consider the wiretap channel of type II introduced in [19] , i.e., |S|= 1, p Z|X = p Z , and for any x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, p Y |X (y|x) = 1{y = x}. Then, the secrecy capacity is
Theorem 3 ( [20] ). Consider the wiretap channel of type II with noisy main channel, i.e., |S|= 1 and p Z|X = p Z . Then, the secrecy capacity is
Theorem 4 ( [21] ). Consider the hybrid Wyner's/type II wiretap channel, i.e., |S|= 1. Then, the secrecy capacity is C s = max 
Moreover, for a degraded wiretap channel, i.e., when for all s ∈ S, X − Y − Z(s), we have C s = max pX min s∈S I(X; Y |Z(s)).
Theorem 6 ( [24] , [25] ). Consider the wiretap channel with arbitrarily varying eavesdropper channel, i.e., assume that s ∈ S N B is unknown to the legitimate users. Assume also that α = 0. We define S as the set of all the convex combinations of elements of S. If there exists a best channel for the eavesdropper, i.e., ∃s * ∈ S, ∀s ∈ S, X − Z s * − Z s , then the secrecy capacity is lower-bounded as 
Moreover, if there exists a best channel for the eavesdropper and for alls ∈ S, X − Y − Z(s), then C s = max pX min s∈S I(X; Y |Z(s)).
Our main result is a unified construction that yields, by appropriate choices of its parameters, explicit coding schemes that achieve the rates in Theorems 1-6. To the best of our knowledge, explicit coding schemes were previously known only for Theorem 1 provided that the legitimate users have access to a pre-shared secret-key with negligible rate, and for Theorem 2.
IV. PROPOSED CODING SCHEME
In this section, we describe an explicit coding scheme that will be shown to achieve the rates described in Theorems 1-6. The coding scheme consists of two parts, an initialization phase presented in IV-B, and the actual secure communication in Section IV-C. The initialization phase allows the legitimate users to share a secret key which is used in the second part of the coding scheme.
A. Notation
For s ∈ S, we consider an arbitrary joint distribution q U XY Z(s) q U X p Y Z(s)|X with |U|= |X |= 2 and such that U − X − (Y, Z(s)). Let K be a power of two, let (U 1:K , X 1:K ) be distributed according to q U 1:K X 1:K K i=1 q U X , and define A 1:K G K U 1:K , V 1:
is the matrix defined in [28] . We also define for δ K 2 −K β , β ∈]0, 1/2[, the sets
Observe that V U |Y ⊂ V U ⊂ H U and V X|U ⊂ V X . We will use the following lemma, which also provides an interpretation for the sets H U |Y and H U . For an interpretation of the sets V U , V U |Y , V X , V X|U in terms of randomness extraction or privacy amplification, we refer to [18] , [29] [30] [31] .
Lemma 1 (Source coding with side information [28] ). Consider a probability distribution p XY over X × Y with |X |= 2 and Y a finite alphabet. Let N be a power of two and consider (X 1:N , Y 1:N ) 
B. Coding scheme: Part I -Initialization
The legitimate users perform the initialization phase described in Algorithms 1 and 2 to generate a secret key with length l key , which will be be specified later in Section VII-B.
The initialization phase operates over B 0 blocks of length N KL, where L, K ∈ N are both power of two. We define B 0 1, B 0 and L 1, L . Encoding at the transmitter and decoding at the receiver are described in Algorithms 1 and 2, respectively.
In each Block b ∈ B 0 , the encoder forms the key Key b with length l key l key /B 0 , as described in Algorithm 1. The encoder uses the following randomization sequences: for Sub-block l ∈ L do 3: Draw A 1:K b,l according to
4:
Perform channel prefixing by forming V 1:K b,l as follows 
Transmit with a channel code [32] 
l key , where denotes multiplication in GF(2 N ) and | 1:l key indicates that only the leftmost l key bits are kept 11 for Sub-block l ∈ L do 4:
From Y 1:K b,l and A 1:K b,l [H U |Y ], form A 1:K b,l an estimate of A 1:K b,l with the successive cancellation decoder for lossless source coding with side information [28] )| 1:l key an estimate of Key b 10: end for Remark 1. In line 7 of Algorithm 2, note that the channel code [32] requires a uniformly distributed message. While l∈L A 1:K b,l [H U |Y ] is not a sequence of uniformly distributed bits, D b is a sequence of uniformly distributed bits over 1, 2 L|HU|Y | .
C. Coding scheme: Part II -Secure commnication
The encoding scheme operates over B blocks of length N KL, where L, K ∈ N are both power of two. We define B 1, B and L 1, L . Encoding at the transmitter and decoding at the receiver are described in Algorithms 3 and 4, respectively.
In each block b ∈ B, the transmitter encodes, as described in Algorithm 3, a message M b uniformly distributed over 1, 2 |Mb| and represented by a binary sequence with length
Algorithms 3 and 4 depend on the parameter
which will be specified later with the constraint L|V U |Y |< r < L|V U |.
In each block b ∈ B, as described in Algorithm 3, the encoder uses R b , a binary randomization sequence only known at the encoder, uniformly distributed over 1, 2 |R b | . The sequences R 1:B (R b ) b∈B are mutually independent. The length of the sequences (R b ) b∈B is defined for b ∈ B as |R b | L|V U |−r.
In each block b ∈ B, the encoder also uses, as described in Algorithm 3, R b , a binary randomization sequence with length L|V U |, uniformly distributed over R {0, 1} L|VU | \{0}. The sequences R 1:B (R b ) b∈B are mutually independent. Moreover, it is assumed that M 1:B , R 1:B , and R 1:B are mutually independent.
We depict in Figure 1 the dependencies between two consecutive encoding blocks. In a given block, we also depict in Figure 2 a summary of the different phases in Algorithm 3 through wich the encoder output is obtained. 
V. STATEMENT OF MAIN RESULTS
Our main result is the following theorem.
Theorem 7. Consider the coding scheme described in Algorithms 3, 4 combined with the initialization phase described in Algorithms 1, 2.
1) If all the components of s b , b ∈ B, are identical, then the following secrecy rate is achieved
2) Assume that the components of s b , b ∈ B, are arbitrary. If there exists a best channel for the eavesdropper, then the following secrecy rate is achieved
The proof of Theorem 7.1 is presented in two parts. First, in Section VI, the initialization phase, i.e., Algorithms 1, 2, is ignored and Theorem 7.1 is proved under the assumption that the legitimate users have a pre-shared key whose rate is negligible. Next, in Section VII, Theorem 7.1 is proved without this assumption by considering the initialization phase combined with Algorithms 3, 4. The proof of Theorem 7.2 largely relies on the proof of Theorem 7.1 and is presented in Section VIII. Finally, from Theorem 7, we immediately obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. The coding scheme described in Algorithms 3, 4 combined with the initialization phase described in Algorithms 1, 2, achieves the secrecy rates described in Theorems 1-6 with an appropriate choice of q U X .
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 7.1 WHEN A PRE-SHARED SECRET KEY IS AVAILABLE
In this section, we prove Theorem 7.1 when the legitimate users have access to a pre-shared secret key whose rate is negligible. Hence, we ignore in this section the initialization phase, i.e., Algorithms 1, 2.
We also assume in this section that all the components of s b , b ∈ B, are identical and equal to s. To simplify notation, we write s instead of s b , b ∈ B. 
where (a) holds by Line 7 in Algorithm 4, (b) holds by (13) , (c) holds by the union bound, (d) holds
Kδ K by the error probability for distributed source coding [28] and because P[ 
where δ(K) is such that lim K→∞ δ(K) = 0 since lim K→∞ |H U |Y |/K = H(U |Y ) [28] , and lim K→∞ |V U |Y |/K = H(U |Y ) [29] , [35] .
D. Blockwise Security Analysis
We prove in this section that security holds in each block b ∈ B individually. We use a series of lemmas to obtain this result and determine acceptable values for the parameter r defined in (11) . For (X, Z) distributed according to p XZ , defined over the finite alphabet X × Z, recall that the -smooth min-entropy of X given Z is defined as [36] 
We will also need the following version of the leftover hash lemma. 
where p UK and p UF are the uniform distribution over {0, 1} r and R, respectively.
Define the function F :
)| 1:r , where r is defined in (11) and | 1:r indicates that only the left-most r bits are kept. F is known to be a two-universal hash function [15] . We now would like to use Lemma 3 with the goal of making (M b M b ) almost independent from the eavesdropper channel observations. However, in the encoding scheme described
is not defined as the output of a two-universal hash function as required in Lemma 3. To overcome this difficulty, we show in the following lemma that the distribution p induced by the encoder in Algorithm 3 also describes a process for which
).
with q Tb the uniform distribution over {0, 1} |VU |L , q Rb the uniform distribution over R, and ∀m b , ∀t b , ∀r b , 
where δ (1) 
Proof. See Appendix C.
Next, using Lemma 2, we lower bound the conditional entropy in (20) in the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Fix b ∈ B. We adopt the same notation as in Lemmas 4, 5. We have
where we have defined
with H b (·) the binary entropy.
Proof. See Appendix D.
By combing Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 we obtain the following result.
Lemma 7. Fix b ∈ B. We adopt the same notation as in Lemma 6. We have for any γ ∈]0, 1[
where δ (3) (K, L) δ (1) (K, L) + δ (2) (K, L), with δ (1) (K, L) defined in Lemma 5 and δ (2) (L, K) defined in Lemma 6.
Finally, we obtain security in a given block as follows.
with ξ > 0 and δ (3) (K, L) defined in Lemma 7. We have for L large enough
Proof. We adopt the same notation as in the previous lemmas. By definition of r and by Lemma 7, we have
We thus have
where (a) holds by [37] with f : x → x log(2 N /x), (b) holds for L large enough because f is increasing for small enough values.
E. Analysis of security over all blocks jointly
We obtain security over all blocks jointly from Lemma 8 as follows. 
where where (a) holds by (11) , (b) holds by the choice of r in Lemma 8 and because lim K→∞ |V U |Y |/K = H(U |Y ) by [29] , [35] , (c) holds by [29, Lemma 1], [35] .
G. Randomness amortization
The randomness (R b ) 1:B in the coding scheme of Section IV-C needs to be shared between the legitimate users. This can be done with negligible impact on the overall communication rate similar to [15] using an hybrid argument by repeating the coding scheme of Section IV-C with the same randomness (R b ) 1:B .
VII. PROOF OF THEOREM 7.1 (WITHOUT PRE-SHARED KEY)
The coding scheme of Section IV-C requires a pre-shared secret key between the legitimate users.
We now consider the initialization phase, described in Algorithms 1, 2, to generate such a key with negligible impact on the overall communication rate. We study the reliability and the secrecy of the generated key in Sections VII-A and VII-B, respectively, the impact of the initialization phase on the overall communication rate in Section VII-C, and the joint secrecy of the initialization phase and the coding scheme of Section IV-C in Section VII-D. We adopt the same notation as in Section VI.
A. Key reliability
We have following lemma, whose proof is similar to the one of Lemma 2, and is thus omitted. Then, we have
where the last inequality holds similar to (17) .
B. Key secrecy
We first show secrecy in a given Block b ∈ B 0 . Let A b ⊂ 1, N such that |A b |= αN and consider 
2δ (4) (K, L, ξ),
l key , and δ (4) (K, L, ξ) is defined in Lemma 8.
Proof. The first inequality holds similar to the proof of Lemma 8 by using (25) in place of (21) . The second inequality holds by [37, Lemma 2.7] and (25) .
By mutual independence of all the B 0 blocks of the initialization phase, we obtain from Lemma 12 the following result. 
We deduce from (26) that the communication rate of the coding scheme of Section IV-C and the initialization phase (considered jointly) is the same as the communication rate of the coding scheme of Section IV-C alone.
D. Security of Algorithms 3, 4 and the initialization phase when considered jointly
Let M OTP be the sequence that needs to be secretly transmitted with a one-time pad in Algorithm 3. Let Finally, we obtain the lemma with Lemmas 9 and 13.
VIII. PROOF OF THEOREM 7.2
We assume in the following that there exists a best channel for the eavesdropper [24] , i.e., ∃s * ∈ S, ∀s ∈ S, X − Z s * − Z s . Similar to the proof of Theorem 7.1, we proceed in two steps. We first ignore the initialization phase and assume that the legitimate users have access to a secret key to perform the one-time pad in Algorithms 3, 4. We only show blockwise security as the remainder of the proof is similar to the proof in Section VI. We also omit the second step that consists in analyzing the initialization phase jointly with Algorithms 3, 4, as it is similar to the analysis in Section VII.
A. Blockwise security analysis
We adopt the same notation as in Section VI. We have the following inequality, whose proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 2. For b ∈ B, we have
where we have defined q U 1:N X 1:N Y 1:N Z 1:N (sb) N i=1 q U XY Z(sb,i) . Next, similar to Lemma 5 using (30) in place of Lemma 2, we have for any γ ∈]0, 1[ 
where δ (1) (K, L) is defined in Lemma 5. We then have
where (a) holds as in the proof of Lemma 6 with δ (2) (K, L) defined in Lemma 6, (b) holds because
forms a Markov chain, (c) holds as in the proof of Lemma 6. Finally, from (31) and (32), we can conclude as in Section VI-D.
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We developed an explicit coding scheme for the wiretap channel. We proved that within a unified coding scheme and with appropriate parameter choices, our coding scheme achieves the secrecy capacity of (i) Wyner's wiretap channel, (ii) the wiretap channel of type II, (iii) the wiretap channel of type II with noisy main channel, (iv) the hybrid Wyner's/type II wiretap channel, and the best known singleletter achievable secrecy rates for (v) the wiretap channel when uncertainties hold on the eavesdropper's channel statistics (compound model), (vi) the wiretap channel when the eavesdropper's channel statistics are arbitrarily varying.
Our coding scheme can also be applied to the problem of secret sharing, first introduced in [38] for channel models, and then extended in [39] to source models. Specifically, our construction can be applied to the case of a single dealer when the access structure is the set of all participants, i.e., when all the participants need to pool their share together to recover the secret.
While much remains to be done to reduce the overall blocklength of the coding scheme, our result provides the first explicit coding scheme for some wiretap channel models and improves previous constructions by achieving larger secrecy rates or relaxing assumptions such as symmetry/degradation of the channels and the necessity of a pre-shared secret key at the legitimate users.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Let b ∈ B and l ∈ L. We have
where (a) holds by the chain rule for relative entropy [40] , (b) holds by (14) , (c) holds because the bits 
where (a) and (c) hold by the chain rule for relative entropy [40] , (b) holds by (33) and because D(q U 1:K p U 1:K b,l ) = D(q A 1:K p A 1:K b,l ) by invertibility of G K , (d) holds by (15) , We will use the following lemma. holds by choosing δ (1) (K, L) (K −1 + 1) √ 2L γ−1 δ (0) (K, L)/K.
Remark 5.
An argument similar to the one in [6] to lower bound the min-entropy does not seem easily applicable in our case and would complexify the coding scheme with an extra round of reconciliation as in [42] . Lemma 15 appears to be a simpler alternative here.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF LEMMA 6
We first introduce some notation for convenience. Define for any I ⊆ 1, K , A b [I] ( A 1:K b,l [I]) l∈L and A b ( A 1:K b,l ) l∈L . For b ∈ B, consider (U 1:K b,l , X 1:K b,l , Z 1:K b,l (s)) l∈L distributed according to q U 1:N X 1:N Z 1:N (s) N i=1 q U XZ(s) and define for l ∈ L, A 1:K b,l G K U 1:K b,l . Next, define for any
